This is a guest note by Daniel Levy, co-director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation.

During the Barak Government, Levy worked in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office as special adviser and head of Jerusalem Affairs, following which Mr. Levy worked as senior policy adviser to then Israeli Minister of Justice, Yossi Beilin. In this capacity he was responsible for coordinating policy on various issues including peace negotiations, civil and human rights, and the Palestinian minority in Israel. Mr. Levy was a member of the official Israeli delegation to the Taba negotiations with the Palestinians in January 2001, and previously served on the Israeli negotiating team to the "Oslo B" Agreement from May to September 1995, under Prime Minister Rabin. He also served as the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative, a joint Israeli-Palestinian effort that suggests a detailed model for a peace agreement to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From 2003 to 2004, he worked as an analyst for the International Crisis Group Middle East Program.

ON U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND AMATEURISM

This was not a good week for the Obama administration's Middle East peace efforts. Speaking alongside Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in Jerusalem last Saturday, Secretary Clinton seemed to be praising the distinctively partial limitations that Israel was willing to implement on settlement non-expansion. During the following days in Morocco and Cairo, she walked those remarks back, but the damage had been done.

By Thursday, the American-sponsored Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was sufficiently exasperated to announce that he will not be standing for re-election, and all week the media and political commentary on the U.S. approach was scathing about America's efforts--even by Middle East standards.

Speaking to the Washington Post, I described the U.S. approach of the past days as amateurish--a perhaps harsh, but unfortunately apt, label. On the positive side, I think the administration folks are themselves aware that this is not going swimmingly. The overall administration scorecard on Middle East peace is slipping into the red.

But first, let's be fair about that record.

The Obama administration merits significant credit for having acknowledged from the get-go that advancing a solution on Israel-Palestine, or at least reaching a post-occupation equilibrium, is a key American national interest--a realization that was belatedly groped at by the Bush administration and was set forth from day one by its successor. That displays a keen understanding of the centrality of how the Israeli-Palestinian issue impacts America's standing and ability to advance its goals, including the push back against extremism in the region and beyond. National Security adviser General Jones repeated the assertion last week at the J Street conference. Credit, too, for the administration for acting on this. A senior envoy, Senator Mitchell, was appointed on day two, and deployed shuttling back and forth to the region. The President delivered a ground-breaking speech in Cairo, the Arab world was deeply engaged (unlike the past), and a marker was set down on settlements. It was on this latter issue of settlements, however, where things began to unravel.

The Obama team's call for a comprehensive settlement freeze was consistent with past U.S. policy (notably Bush's Roadmap of 2003), although it was perhaps treated with more seriousness coming from the new 'hope and change' President. The Israel Prime Minister's answer came in June, and it was a rejectionist one: no full freeze, and no limitations whatsoever on settlements in East Jerusalem. That is when the malaise set in.

The administration had three possible options in responding:

1) Stick to its guns and calibrate a set of escalating consequences in response to possible ongoing Israeli recalcitrance.

2) Make a smart pivot by declaring, for instance, that if Israel could not for its own reasons freeze settlements, then this would make all the more urgent the need to quickly define and agree a border for an Israel-Palestine two-state solution. And the U.S. could reasonably have adopted a formula regarding that border (such as based on the 1967 lines, minor mutual modifications to accommodate settlements close to the Green Line in a one-to-one land swap). The U.S. could have explained to its Israeli friends that absent a defined border, the settlement freeze would have to be comprehensive, but in the discussion on borders, there could be more flexibility given the one-to-one land swaps.

3) Dig themselves into a hole. Insisting on a freeze, heightening expectations, without a plan for achieving that end, and by then acceding to talks with the Israeli government over koshering aspects of settlements expansion.

It is certainly legitimate for the administration to have not chosen option one, and to have decided that this was the wrong issue and/or wrong timing to escalate with the Netanyahu government. My own preference would have been for option two, and indeed, the administration could reasonably be perceived to have laid the ground deftly for such a pivot. Unfortunately, they went for option three, and it all came crashing down around their feet this week.

The Secretary's last minute stop in Cairo to round off the trip said it all. The Mubarak regime tried to help salvage some American pride, lining up behind the Secretary's efforts. Except that it is precisely the Mubarak government whose credibility is so severely questioned in the region, it is the largest Arab recipient of American financial assistance, and is obsessed with leadership succession--in short, getting a smile out of the Egyptian leader doesn't even register on the congratulatory charts.

There is nonetheless potentially good news in all of this. Those who are writing off the administration's peace efforts, friend and foe alike, are being premature in the extreme. This is a benefit of starting on day one--you can acknowledge the need for a course correction in month ten. In fact, it is not the new approach of the Obama administration that has failed, but rather, this is a moment of clarity regarding the bankruptcy of the old approach that has guided policy for over a decade and that the Obama team had inherited and embraced.

As Rob Malley and others have argued, what is needed now is a review (as has been conducted in other foreign policy areas) and a testing and likely abandonment of many of the prevailing policy assumptions. These might include the notion that one can incrementally build confidence between the sides when the prevailing reality is one of occupation, that bilateral negotiations between representatives of an occupied people and the occupying party can deliver de-occupation, that Palestinian political division should be encouraged (not overcome), or that proven self governance capacity under occupation is a precondition for freedom and independence.

If the goal still is Israel's security, recognition, and a guaranteed future as a democracy and a Jewish national home, alongside a secure, viable, and post-occupation Palestine and advancing America's national interest, and this should be the goal, then a new path is needed for reaching that destination. It will certainly require more international and U.S. lifting.

The Obama team is perfectly capable of charting a course from a bad week to a game-changing success, but more of the same won't get them there.

-- Daniel Levy

This is a guest note by Kevin Nealer. Nealer has been a Fulbright professor of trade law & policy in China and is Guest Lecturer at Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business.

Obama's Big Asia Trip: State of Play and Expectations

As President Obama's Asia trip begins, it may be useful to look at how the table is set for the most complex relationship an American President must manage:

o Obama successfully avoided the opening foreign policy crisis with China that has become typical for most new American administrations (recall the April 2001 reconnaissance plane incident in Bush 43's first term). Indeed, the shared challenge of global economic risk was managed in a way that has deepened habits of cooperation in both capitals. China and the U.S. enacted stimulus measures with the result that both are closer to recovery than many other economies.

o A year ago, the blogosphere in China reflected popular acrimony about the economic meltdown, putting the blame squarely on the American system. At least at elite and senior policy levels, those instincts have largely given way to a sentiment that globalization itself transmits risk. While American practices may be the proximate cause of this crisis, memories of Asia's '97 crisis are fresh enough to convince senior leaders that markets never correct: they overcorrect. No one is immune. (One Chinese official recently asked: "So are your academics still studying 'decoupling' theories?")

o The most neuralgic trade issues - RMB valuation and US import sensitivities - have been managed in very different ways. The Obama Administration did not cite China as a currency manipulator, electing to use the financial crisis to prompt a deeper - and quieter - conversation about the danger of imbalances, and our shared savings/disavings dilemma. While critics railed against the Section 421 tire decision, that case and subsequent WTO actions reveal a verity of all trade disputes. As has been true for decades with the U.S., EU and Japan, trade disputes are an artifact of high levels of trade (i.e. shared success), and these points of contention are managed through negotiations and litigation. The results need not infect the larger relationship.

o Tension over Taiwan -- the most serious bilateral security challenge -- is at a sixty year low. While a free trade agreement between Beijing and Taipei faces political challenges, cross-strait ties -including direct flights - have never been deeper. Indeed, the near-term challenge for the U.S. may be to reshape policies to take advantage of this thaw. China's military has, for its part, shown a failure of imagination in responding to the risk reduction, continuing to maintain missiles and hardware poised for an attack. If China dislikes U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, it needs to give evidence that it understands that the changed circumstances should be to everyone's advantage.

o The military-to-military dialogue may be far less productive than the interests of both countries require, but it has made more progress in the past year than in the previous decade. Secretary Gates and Chief of Naval Operations Roughead have taken the initiative to increase cooperation on incidents at sea and responses to natural disasters and piracy.

What work must the trip do? There should be no necessary divergence of fundamental interests over the world's most dangerous places: North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan.

China has gone from "renting the room" for Six Party Talks to playing an important role in decreasing risk on the Korean Peninsula. Now is the time for a renewed effort on that score.

A nuclear-armed Iran would be a genuine threat to a China that faces a domestic Muslim separatist challenge. If the American-led initiative to secure Iran's enriched uranium fails, China's economic and energy interests in Iran are likely to be at risk. If successfully managing the America relationship is, in fact, a key goal of China's leadership, activism is required to avoid a worst-case outcome in Iran.

So, too, China shares an obligation to support stability in Pakistan, where it enjoys decades of confidence based on its special relationship with Islamabad.

The Chinese leadership has never been embarrassed into human rights improvements. It seems clear that President Obama's decision to delay a meeting with the Dali Lama reflects a preference for progress rather than photo ops.

Encouraging China's leaders to address the demands of the world's fastest growing middle class - and the restive poor -- for authentic legal, environmental, and social justice is best done face-to-face and with the renewed moral authority that America is slowly regaining.

-- Kevin Nealer

What follows below is an interesting article that I am going to post in full as it does not at this point appear to be available on the internet anywhere. Out of respect for Nahum Barnea and Yedioth Ahronoth, I will clip the piece and provide a link to Ynet News when this article appears on the web.

But in my estimation, this is an extremely informed analysis of the dynamics between Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama and simply must be read and considered before Netanyahu lands in Washington. My guess is that the author has spoken directly to many of the very top tier Israeli principals. -- Steve Clemons

Half a Meeting

Yedioth Ahronoth -- 6 November 2009

The Prime Minister's Bureau labored and discovered that there was one visit of a prime minister to the US--by Sharon in May 2005--in which there was no meeting between him and the president (Sharon had met with Bush in April, and the two saw no need to meet again). This precedent was meant to explain that it would no disaster if, in the course of Netanyahu's trip to Washington next week, there would be no meeting between him and Obama. For days the White House has refused to set a date for a meeting. It was embarrassing and humiliating. Netanyahu was angry. Not mildly angry. He was incensed.

I'm guessing that in the end there will be a meeting. It will take place because not having it will depict Netanyahu as the victim and Obama as the enemy of Israel. That would damage Obama in the Jewish community, damage that he can less and less afford.

Should it take place, the meeting will not meet the role it was assigned. It will be forced, coerced. It will not give Netanyahu an opportunity to clean the slate, to turn over a new leaf, to create trust, to build intimacy. Relations are cloudy, admit sources on both sides. There is mutuality in this crisis, there is symmetry: Obama is convinced that Netanyahu stuck a knife in his back; Netanyahu is convinced that Obama is the one who stuck the knife.

Above this troubling story, which has still not turned into headlines, hovers a cloud of failure. The Obama administration failed abysmally in the strategic step it took, which was meant to turn the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians into the engine that would bring the entire region under America's wing, from the Mediterranean Sea to the edges of Afghanistan. His failure is liable to ultimately be our disaster. Ironically, the only ray of light at the moment is the activity relating to Iran.

Netanyahu is sure that he knows who is to blame: White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel. He heard inside information, from the White House, verified information. Emanuel drips venom. My sources may be less good, but the picture they paint is different. Netanyahu's problem, they say, is not Emanuel. It is Obama.

Netanyahu is convinced that since the first day of his term, Emanuel has been plotting to isolate Israel from America, to shrink it in the eyes of its voters and to destroy it politically. This step failed. Support for Israel in American public opinion has only increased. It's not Israel that is isolated in America, but rather the Palestinians. Personal admiration for him also increased. It increased in wake of his speech at the UN General Assembly. There are no other leaders in the world today that speak to Americans in their own language. They've known him in America for 30 years now.

Netanyahu read polls (one of them was apparently carried out by Stanley Greenberg, who was Clinton's and Barak's adviser). The polls showed him the degree to which his standing is strong in American public opinion. America is not Europe. In Europe, Netanyahu could be described as a peace rejectionist. Not in America. The president is very important, but so is Congress. With all due respect to the president and his aides, when the public has an opinion, public opinion decides.

From Netanyahu's point of view, relations started off on the left foot. The emphatic demand of Obama administration to freeze construction in the settlements completely, a demand meant to hurt him, led to a confrontation. He was accused of being stubborn. He was also accused of the opposite, that he was easy to coerce. The assumption was that he would take a blow and collapse. This didn't happen in Israel and it didn't happen in America.

It didn't happen because he chose a combined response. In his Bar Ilan speech, he promised to support the idea of two states. He promised to be forthcoming toward the Americans, but made it clear that he would not go all the way. He went farther than what the majority of Israelis want to go and the majority of Jews in America. He acted with integrity and transparency: every Israeli step was reported to the Americans in real time, including the secret trip to Putin.

In the meantime, the Americans have learned a few things. The Arab rulers, who were supposed to provide the quid pro quo in unfreezing relations with Israel, gave nothing. Abu Mazen changed his spots. Because of domestic political considerations, he refused to begin negotiations. The Arab rulers betrayed him. He is now threatening to resign.

An argument waged in the White House. According to the information that reached Netanyahu, Hillary Clinton and Mitchell and others explained to the president that he had to rely on Netanyahu. Not out of love: out of recognizing reality. A parallelogram of forces was created: they on one side, Emanuel on the other. Netanyahu believes that Obama is pragmatic. After consideration, he will go with public opinion.

I'm not certain that Netanyahu realizes to what degree Obama is different in character than his two predecessors. It's hard to bend him, and even harder to win his heart. In Netanyahu's first term, he got into a frontal clash with president Bush the father. He learned then that despite the support, despite the accessibility, despite the common language, in such clashes, he cannot win.

The question of who is right in the crisis that has been created is of secondary importance. Israel is dependent up to its neck on the American administration's good will. It is dependent on it if it wishes to reach a solution to the conflict (Netanyahu believes that he is capable of reaching an agreement. He knows that he is the only one of his ministers who believes that he, of all people, will reach an agreement).

And it is dependent on the administration in the Iranian matter. Our old acquaintance Dennis Ross plays a major role in the administration's handling of the Iranians. The good news for Israel is that there has been progress toward imposing concrete sanctions. The bad news is that Obama was angered again, with the criticism of the Americans that Ehud Barak made. Netanyahu was quick to fix it. So was Barak. Nevertheless, the damage was done.

-- Nahum Barnea

After a long, messy battle between Senator Jim DeMint and the Obama administration, Senator DeMint removed his holds on two key administration appointees whose nominations have been languishing pending the outcome over a battle involving the Honduras ouster of President Manuel Zelaya.

In his statement on the Senate floor, DeMint lavished praise on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon -- whose nomination as the next US Ambassador to Brazil DeMint also had on hold -- for yielding to his views that whether or not the Honduras legislature votes Zelaya back into office that the Obama administration will recognize the outcome of the coming November 29th elections as legitimate and fair.

There is growing dispute about a Honduran government deal with Zelaya that the ousted leader now says the de facto government is not abiding by. Some suggest that Jim DeMint had some influence on pulling apart the Honduran deal with his own negotiations with the Obama administration over what was needed for the US to recognized the November election results.

The great news is that Arturo Valenzuela, Professor of Government and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, has now been confirmed as Thomas Shannon's successor as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs.

Valenzuela served at the White House as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council in the second term of the Clinton administration.

Only problem is that one of the other key players in this Shakespearian political drama, Tom Shannon (who Jim DeMint now thinks is great!) got stuck on the floor last night when recently appointed Senator George LeMiuex began to flex his Senatorial muscles by not allowing Shannon's nomination to be voted on with a big passle of other nominees who were unanimously approved by the Senate at 5:30 pm yesterday evening.

Allegedly, the pro-embargo, anti-Castro crowd hijacked the Freshman Senator -- who will show great promise as a US Senator when he doesn't yield so publicly to the overtly crude and frivolous whims of fanatics who will lose the battle on Tom Shannon, but who want to waste the government's time.

-- Steve Clemons

My liberal friends who watch Latin America often cringe when I say this, but I really don't like Hugo Chavez.

I recognize that he was democratically elected -- but I think he's a reckless leader in Latin America who has too much of a frequency to animate trouble beyond his borders.

In my play book Venezuela today is somewhat like the Iran of Latin America -- and Cuba is Syria. I support immediate, serious engagement and a redirection of US-Cuba relations and US-Syria relations because that course would automatically rob both Iran and Venezuela of running room in their regions.

The latest from Hugo Chavez is. . .the three minute shower.

From a UPI report:

In the most direct response to the shortages yet, Chavez himself went on air to warn industries they would have their utilities cut off if they did not check wastage. For citizens fumbling in the dark due to power cuts, Chavez advised the use of a torch.

"If you get up at three in the morning to use the toilet, use a torch instead of turning the light on; that's enough light, you don't need more. Just leave the torch by the bed, it's that simple," Chavez said during an emergency Cabinet meeting, broadcast live.

He advised Venezuelans to get into the habit of showering for no more than three minutes.

Industry sources said that power generation plants nationalized by Chavez in 2007 needed not only new infusions of capital but also better management and due diligence to ensure their performance was competitive and made the best use of resources. Venezuelan opposition says very few investments have been made in the power sector since Chavez took office in 1999 after a landslide election victory the previous year.

I know that the US needs to deal with Chavez -- though i think we need to do a better job containing him.

I seriously doubt that Hugo Chavez takes three minute showers himself -- and I know that the world leaders who meet Chavez will need a lot longer under the spigot than that to feel clean again.

Just reminds me of that rather big pig in Animal Farm.

-- Steve Clemons

Kind of sad when you see a Freshman US Senator get appointed and immediately hijacked by lobbying groups who have deeply parochial interests that run against the nation's and even Senator George LeMieux's own state of Florida.

Last night, the US Senate finally moved to confirm Obama-nominated Georgetown Professor Arturo Valenzuela as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs and the incumbent in that job, Thomas Shannon, as US Ambassador to Brazil. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate itself was able to finally overcome the holds placed by Senator Jim DeMint who has been waging a one man battle to get someone to pay respect to Honduras coup officials.

But as the machinery for the vote was unfolding, the recently appointed frosh Senator George LeMieux (R-FL) -- appointed to fill Senator Mel Martinez's vacated seat -- placed a hold on Shannon's nomination, allegedly at the behest of the US-Cuba Democracy PAC that is ticked for Shannon's handling of the Cuba OAS resolution earlier this year.

I hope that Barack Obama's team -- including National Security Council Western Hemisphere Director Dan Restrepo -- and those higher up the chain like NSC Deputy Tom Donilon -- get a sense of who the reasonable players in the US-Cuba policy debate are who are working hard for Obamaesque strategies with Cuba -- vs. those who are still trying to keep the freezers blowing on the last refuge of the Cold War.

-- Steve Clemons

Each month when I get the official unemployment figures from the US government, I quickly search in my inbox for a note from former cable network CEO and senior economic adviser in the John Edwards and Barack Obama campaigns Leo Hindery who sends me the "effective unemployment" figures that many economic commentators from Joseph Stiglitz to Mort Zuckerman to Bob Herbert are begninning to use.

Official unemployment surged to 10.2% according to an announcement today.

Here is the Hindery Report on Effective Unemployment:

Using its Current Population Survey (CPS) of Non-Farm Jobs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics just announced this morning, November 6, 2009, that, "Total non-farm payroll employment declined by 190,000 in October and the unemployment rate crept to a 26-year high of 10.2 percent, up from 9.8 percent in September."

However, as we have been noting, the public BLS figures, while widely distributed, notably exclude changes in employment among the nation's 10,968,000 farm and self-employed workers, who are more than 7% of the Civilian Labor Force, and they do not take into account the 14,905,000 workers who are part-time-of-necessity (9,284,000), marginally attached (2, 373,000), or "discouraged" and have left the labor force (3,248,000).

The Summary of U.S. Effective Unemployment - more accurately (1) includes farm and self-employed workers and (2) accounts for effectively unemployed workers not in the official BLS announcement. This Summary also identifies various measures of weeks unemployed, job openings, and job shortfalls.

Accordingly, as adjusted, at the end of October 2009 or for the month:

1. Total combined employment - nonfarm, farm and self-employed - declined by 484,000 jobs in the month instead of the BLS-announced non-farm only figure of 190,000;

2. The total number of effectively unemployed and underemployed workers is 30,605,000 not the BLS-announced number of 15,700,000; and

3. The effective unemployment rate is 19.18% not the BLS-announced rate of 10.20%.

Since the official start of the recession in December 2007, the number of effectively unemployed and underemployed workers has increased by 13,723,000, instead of by the aggregate 8,159,000 jobs loss figure that the BLS officially reports. In contrast, we needed to create 2,376,000 new jobs in these 22 months just to keep up with the natural growth in the labor force of 108,000 workers per month.

For workers in the official Civilian Labor Force, the average number of weeks unemployed is now 26.9. And the number of workers unemployed 27 weeks and longer stands at 8,842,000 (i.e., 5,594,000 officially counted plus the 3,248,000 discouraged workers).

-- Steve Clemons

This is a guest note by former Senator Ernest F. "Fritz" Hollings (D-SC) who served for 39 years in the United States Senate. He is the author of Making Government Work, which Steve Clemons recommends for anyone wanting to understand more about legislative structure and process. Many of his other essays can be found at Citizens for a Competitive America.

OUT!

We learned after ten years and 58,000 dead in Vietnam that you can't force feed democracy.

And now corrupt foreigners can't force feed a corrupt democracy in Afghanistan. After eight years and 833 dead in Afghanistan, the United States mission boils down to that described in a New York Times editorial of November 3rd, entitled "President Karzai's Second Term:"

(a) Mr. Karzai must prove that after "seven years of mismanagement and corruption ... he is deserving of [his people's] trust."

(b) Mr. Karzai "must appoint a new group of ministers and provincial governors who are committed to rebuilding their country, not enriching themselves."

(c) "The Interior Ministry, which oversees the corruption-plagued Afghan National Police, must be reformed."

(d) "The agriculture, energy and private development agencies all [get] better leadership."

(e) The Afghan people need "to see their government working to protect them and improve their lives...."

(f) Mr. Karzai must "reach out to members of the opposition, choosing competent technocrats for senior jobs."

(g) Mr. Karzai must "break ties with his most unsavory cronies."

(h) Mr. Karzai must demand that Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostrum "stand trial for his crimes."

(i) Mr. Karzai finally cuts "his ties with his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, whom American officials say is a big player in the opium trade."

(j) "Washington must also cut its ties with the younger Mr. Karzai ... [who] received regular payments from the CIA for the past eight years."

(k) As Mr. Karzai kills the Taliban, he must "work with the Americans to come up with a strategy to try to woo mid-level Taliban leaders in from the cold."

(l) Mr. Karzai and the U. S. "need to quickly develop a plan to accelerate training of the Afghan security forces."

We can't ask GIs to lose their arms and legs, even life itself, for this mission.

OUT!

-- Fritz Hollings, former United States Senator from South Carolina

Today, the government announced a surge in the national unemployment figure of 10.2% -- which seriously underestimates the 'effective unemployment' rate of those who have stopped looking for work or who are undermployed.

Leo Hindery issues these numbers regularly, and I will post them when I receive them.

But yesterday, Joe Biden mentioned during his talk at the Center for American Progress that 3rd quarter GDP growth was 3.5%.

With a surge in official unemployment -- we now see the handwriting on the wall of a jobless recovery.

When Obama was pushing Congress to pass the stimulus package, he said it was about jobs, jobs, jobs!

But the reality is that there is a profound level of job destruction in the country -- and the greatest number of jobs Obama and his economic team seem to have saved seem to be at Goldman Sachs and fellow traveling financial sector firms.

-- Steve Clemons

For some time, I have been writing that the US has lost sight of its al Qaeda-rationalized strategic objectives in Afghanistan and stumbled into a civil war. Recently resigned US official Matthew Hoh also frames the challenge in Afghanistan as that of a 35 year old civil war in which the forces are far bigger than anything the US can influence.

Now, my friend and IISS consulting senior fellow Nader Mousavizadeh also characterizes the mess in Afghanistan as a civil war in which one side is inimical to American interests. He wants to condition the support for the Karzai government on a clean-up campaign.

My objection to this approach is that it remains a far cry from why we went to Afghanistan and doesn't on its merits and given other possible containment strategies justify the sacrifice of lives and scarce financial resources.

The Afghanistan quagmire is also an ongoing global embarrassment of American impotence in failing to redirect and rewire one of the poorest nations of the world. The cost can't be measured just in terms of troops and dollars but also fueling Iran's ambitions and those of other would-be foes and the costs of doubt in US abilities among allies.

Mousavizadeh writes:

Two conclusions are inescapable from the fiasco of Afghanistan's presidential elections and the McChrystal assessment: There is no electoral solution to Afghan government's crisis of legitimacy, and there is no military solution to the challenge of the Taliban. And when observing the current Afghan conflict not from the perspective of America's post-9/11 intervention, but from Afghanistan's own quarter-century of warfare, a third conclusion becomes still more apparent: What we confront is not, in fact, an insurgency but rather a civil war -- one whose resolution can only be found in a new decentralized Afghan politics based on the enduring, if ugly, realities of power there, and not through another decade of Western military intervention.

If there is one lesson to be drawn from the withdrawal of Hamid Karzai's main rival from the second round of the elections -- and his own subsequent appointment as president for another term -- it is that the ability of outsiders to influence the existing politics of Afghanistan is now near zero, even when the object of our entreaties is a politician whose very existence has long depended entirely on Western support and funding. Like a patient rising from a hospital bed after a near-death experience only to rob his doctor blind on the way out the door, Karzai has conclusively demonstrated that his utility to Western interests -- as well as to the Afghan people whom he's grossly robbed of a chance for representative government -- is over.

This leaves the West with a stark dilemma. We can proceed to invest a government we ourselves have called fraudulent with an authority that few Afghans are willing to grant it, hoping it will eventually eschew the corrupt behavior that has sustained its power to date. Or we can make the unquestionably more difficult decision and insist, as a condition of our continued support, that a new political compact be put in place.

Nader Mousavizadeh's proposal for a new political compact is actually quite intriguing and along the lines of something I support -- which is to get a Bonn Conference II in place drawing together various power players across the board in Afghanistan. He suggests that Lakhdar Brahimi and Richard Holbrooke engineer this. I would add that the personalities driving this also include Pashtun leaders technically but not too enthusiastically inside the Taliban tent and include participants from Iran and other key regional stakeholders.

But that kind of political compact may be undermined rather than moved along by a surge of more US hard power into Afghanistan.

Civil wars that matter can be approached with a combination of approaches -- and a new diplomatically purshed governing compact in Afghanistan is an interesting approach, but the tough truth is that this is not what General McChrystal is calling for.

-- Steve Clemons

Jon Weinberg is a research intern at the New America Foundation/Middle East Task Force.

Last week, Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to the UN, and Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) spoke at RAND's "Afghanistan: Basic Questions--Strategy Choices" conference.

Both emphasized that key strategic choices must be considered before a decision on troops is made.

These points are well taken, but were hardly novel given that everyone and his or her uncle seems to have ideas for a "new" Afghanistan strategy these days.

On the other hand, it's not every day that one hears a good idea for building/rebuilding the Afghan economy. Khalilzad and Levin both expressed their support for the "Sons of Afghanistan" program, which is part of the $680 billion defense bill that President Obama signed on Wednesday. The program is modeled on the "Sons of Iraq" program, which lures former and would-be mercenary insurgents - who arguably comprise the majority of all insurgents - over to fight against their former patrons.

The new defense bill allocates $1.3 billion to "reintegration" programs aimed at individuals "who have renounced violence against the government of Afghanistan."

The success of the program is not guaranteed. Skeptics are quick to point out that Afghanistan is not Iraq and that the former's economic woes far outweigh the latter's. Perhaps that's why the "Sons of Afghanistan" program has been on the table for a while without receiving more serious consideration.

Despite the many challenges of implementation, the logic behind attracting the other side's mercenaries to one's own side is actually quite sound. Moreover, the US government is far more capable of making regular payments than are fickle Afghan warlords and tribal leaders.

Based on this recent statement by Mullah Brader Akhund, the Taliban's leadership seems either legitimately threatened by or completely dismissive of the program's potential impact.

The Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are not mercenaries and employed gunmen like the armed men of the invaders and their surrogates. This war will come to an end when all invaders leave our country and an Islamic government based on the aspirations of our people is formed in the country.

But in a country with $12-billion GDP, a well-managed $1.3 billion program could make a significant difference.

-- Jon Weinberg

With President Obama off to Tokyo next week to kickoff his first trip to Asia as president, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is hosting a public forum today to discuss the administration's policy options and challenges in the region.

The event - which will STREAM LIVE here at The Washington Note from 12:15pm - 2:00pm - features Carnegie Endowment experts Douglas Paal, Michael Pettis, Taiya Smith, and Michael Swaine.

The complexities facing President Obama in Asia are underestimated. Japan has been a taken for granted ally -- and is now under new political management as the Democratic Party of Japan walloped the LDP in August elections. The new Prime Minister has mentioned but not outlined specifics about a call for a new "East Asian Community" that seems for the moment as if it would include China but exclude the United States. There are lots of suspicions on the Obama team about Hatoyama's intent. There are issues related to US military basing arrangements that are stressful and Japan's evolving role on global security and economic matters looks confusing to some.

China too and its increasingly intimate relationship with America's core policy course on global economic matters, climate change policy, and statecraft with problem nations like North Korea and Iran are also key.

Human rights issues in Burma hang over Obama's agenda. And addressing the identity needs and relative independence of Southeast Asian nations who both worry about and simultaneously embrace China's rise also needs presidential attention -- which is an increasingly scarce commodity given other domestic and international problems on the plate.

Obama needs to convince Asia that it matters in the roster of his and America's priorities -- even though the US is distracted in so many other directions. This session should be an interesting primer on those who want to study how Obama might walk that tightrope.

It is interesting to note that most still see the next century as an "Asian Century" but America is stumbling over itself to be involved just about everywhere else than there.

Hopefully President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton will change that impression.

-- Steve Clemons

WASHINGTON, DC -- 10:00 am -- Vice President Joe Biden was raised in Scranton, Pennsylvania and has lived for decades in Wilmington, Delaware -- both working middle class communities that have been under siege from both domestic and international economic forces.

This morning at the Center for American Progress, Biden is going to host a discussion on the factors undermining America's middle class with a number of scholars and public intellectuals. I'm here now at the meeting which is co-sponsored with the Economic Policy Institute.

I have no idea whether anything substantial will be disclosed today -- but I wanted to hear Biden first hand discuss what he thinks needs to happen with the economy.

Joe Biden has been playing the role of "skunk at the picnic" in the tough internal strategy discussions on America's Afghanistan course -- and I applaud that. He deserves real credit for not jumping on policy bandwagons in the White House.

I'm hoping Joe Biden will increasingly be willing to play the role of "skunk at the picnic" in taking on the Lawrence Summers-dominated economic framework that the Obama administration has thus far strongly embraced.

Here is the link to the live webcast:

Others participating in the discussion will be Melody Barnes, Director of the White House Domestic Policy Council and a former senior staff member at the Center for American Progress; Lawrence Mishel, President, Economic Policy Institute; Heather Boushey, Senior Economist, Center for American Progress; Jim Kessler, Vice President for Policy, Third Way; Isabel Sawhill, Senior Fellow on Economic Studies, Brookings Institution; Ralph Whitehead, Professor of Journalism, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Interesting group.

10:20 am

I'll be posting updates as this moves along. SEIU's chief Andy Stern just walked in. OMB Watch's Dana Chasin is here too.

10:35 am

Vice President Biden has just arrived. We don't see him yet -- but I hear his voice. There are about 90 people in the room. Just saw now Leo Hindery in the front row. Hindery served as Senior Economic Policy Advisor to John Edwards during his most recent presidential campaign and then was on economic advisory team to candidate Barack Obama.

10:42 am

Chief Economic Advisor to the President Jared Bernstein just walked in the room -- and connected with a lot of folks. He's smart and personable -- like Austan Goolsbee -- which is rare for White House economists.

Center for American Progress EVP Sarah Wartell now introducing the Vice President. Good intro -- focusing on themes of working families and middle class.

10:45 am

Joe Biden just recognized Change to Win Chair Anna Burger and SEIU President Andy Stern for being two of the primary drivers of the administration's Middle Class Task Force.

Biden acknowledges that it was not because of this recession that it all of a sudden dawned on President Obama and himself that supporting the middle class was important now. They have been watching for years -- and concerned about -- the crushing health care costs, educational costs, and other pressures challenging the American middle class. The recession did not cause these recent problems -- but it did seriously aggravate them.

Biden correctly notes that in many American middle class communities where a couple dozen years ago a single paycheck was enough to sustain a family in a nice home -- but now one pay check won't do it. This is a systemic problem -- and Biden suggests that the administration -- in all of its relevant departments and agencies -- must do more to directly impact the deteriorating condition of the American middle class.

The issues of concern to Biden are that correcting these problems is not just about the size or number of paychecks in a family -- its a broader challenge about quality of life involving pensions, education, health care, care for elderly parents. He's talking about the components of the American social contract with its citizens and is suggesting that we need to change the terms, and improve the terms, of that social contract with American working families.

Biden mentioned taking the Middle East Task Force objectives on the road for the first eight months of the administration -- talking about a St. Louis meeting that focused on college education. They went to Denver to talk about "green job opportunities." These trips were followed by meetings in Toledo, Ohio talking about revitalizing "new" rather than "old" manufacturing -- plate glass to solar panels. This was followed by meetings in Silver Springs, Maryland. . .

Biden now introducing the panelists listed above.

Makes the good point that many labor union paychecks can't achieve the middle class life in the way that most Americans have come to consider that life.

11:00 am

In his intro of Melody Barnes, Biden said that while she was a valued Center for American Progress alum in the Obama administration, "She is not coming back to CAP." Biden said "if she goes, I go" and paid tribute to her focus on working to bolster policy support for the American middle class. (too bad Lawrence Summers is not here taking notes)

Biden makes clear that American working families have not been fairly benefiting from the growth and gains that they have been helping to generate for the overall economy. He's not talking about "income redistribution" according to Biden. He said, "we're talking about giving working families a chance at getting on the middle class track" in real terms.

Biden thinks that the adminstration thinks it is making progress -- and is thinking "beyond the recession." He said the US economy grew 3.5% in last quarter -- but that is not anything we can become content about.

Obama said "we need unions", "investments in college affordability to promote mobility", and other nodes of support to fix the ecosystem of support for the American middle class that is really broken.

Biden is saying that the fundamental challenge facing families today is that parents just don't believe today that their children are going to be as well off as they are. The Vice President is arguing that there is a crisis of confidence in the future -- and that many Americans are losing their homes, losing their middle class foundation that supports the hopes and dreams of their families. Biden is right.

Biden continues that jobs are not just about paychecks -- jobs are about dignity. Biden acknowledges that there are an awful lot of Americans being stripped of their dignity and not being given an even shot that gets them in middle class circumstances if they work hard.

Now he is moving to the panel.

11:12 am

Ralph Whitehead now speaking. Each speaker will outline a few points in five minutes are so. Puts on the table that at one point in American history we used to have a goal of a "universal middle class". Began to fall apart in the 1980s.

Lawrence Mishel now up. Says it is important that as we emerge from "the great recession" it is important to help families get an onramp back into middle class circumstances and opportunities. Mishel suggests that the reason the economic waters are so choppy is the long-term, incessant erosion of well-paying jobs. He suggests that this erosion of the American job base is due to policy choices made by government. Thinks growth in an economy can't be driven by debt and asset bubbles -- but rather by productivity increases in a real economy and a real job base. (Joe Biden's body language is signaling that Mishel is going on a bit long. . .ironic actually)

11:24 am

Heather Boushey up. She is addressing the profound changes in the role of women in the working economy. Today only one in five families have a male parent earning a family paycheck with a stay at home mom. Most families in the country are not designed in this 1950s era model -- and our laws and family support structures haven't caught up with the realities of the modern working family. Heather notes that the average working familiy puts in 568 hours more work today than in the past -- 14 weeks more today than thirty years ago -- and this creates huge time squeezes and burdens at home.

Jim Kessler now speaking -- says that median household income is $49,000 but that this represents 19-year old head of households as well as 79-year old head of households. Says we don't have policy for these ranges. Says that there is a difference between economic strategies "to get by" and strategies "to get ahead." These people don't see how government makes their lives appreciably better -- and don't see the government as helping in a pathway to success. Says the problem in America today is that too many Americans no longer believe that they can live up to their own economic and lifestyle aspirations for themselves.

11:35 am

Melody Barnes now at bat -- talking about her journeys around the country asking audiences whether they believed in the "American dream." Hands always went up -- but the fact is that there are a lot of policies in conflict with living the American dream and becoming part of the US middle class.

Says health care is one of the fundamental pillars of American families' middle class goals. Stretching harder and harder to get in to the house in the community with good schools. Says that one job loss or one health incident and a family can fall over the cliff. Talking about Obama's and Biden's discussion about a cradle through career educational structure. Barnes suggests that this kind of educational arc can become a major pillar of support for the middle class.

Barnes says that Immigrants and new immigrants to the country have challenges on health care and education fronts -- says that new US citizens -- have a very tough time getting an on-ramp to the American middle class.

Now apparently going to a conversational format.

Biden says that he is going to be the "devil's advocate" for a moment and pose in his queries as a person who is not in sync with the progressive goals outlined on the panel.

Biden said that an acquaintance of his believes that people have unrealistic aspirations -- that are beyond what they should be -- and that the gap between reality and aspirations is the real problem (but Biden is not saying that this is his own view). . .

Kessler responds that most people don't have lofty aspirations -- that they want a good home, want to be able to educate their children, want good health care, want to be able to take care of their elderly parents, and more of the like. So these basic aspirations have required more work to achieve -- but they remain realistic and fair aspirations.

~~~~

I am going to cease live-blogging the rest of the program. It is an interesting discussion but most of the key points that are being raised by the interesting panel have already been raised before or are fairly easily predicted given the world view of this panel that jobs matter and that the American middle class matters.

What is really interesting about this meeting which does a good job explicating what the political objectives for the nation -- and for the American middle class -- ought to be, it is not in touch with the ideological divide that exists inside the administration today between those focused on macro factors and financial sector health as the primary parameters to work on vs. those who think that there must be a micro-orientation that is sensitive to supporting increasing high-paying jobs and trying to stimulate an innovation economy and related jobs that undergird a healthy middle class.

Biden is posturing as a skeptic in order to challenge the implied assumptions of those on the panel. He just did that querying whether technology -- more than other forces -- was undermining the American job base. '

But the bigger issue really focuses on the Obama administration's own policy choices -- that were targeted on using legislated monies to bail out financial firms -- but not really re-writing the American domestic social contract or doing more to invest in a new infrastructure backbone in the nation on the scale needed to both generate lots of new jobs and create recurring returns for the US economy over future generations.

I really like Biden. I think he's asking the right questions and speaks to the real issues that the American middle class is struggling with.

What is tough to take though is that this whole event would be dramatically different if Lawrence Summers, Timothy Geithner or Christina Romer were on the panel. These three have really been the primary architects of an economic policy that did not have as its north star the middle class, job generation, lifestyle enhancing objectives outlined by the Vice President and the speakers here today at the Center for American Progress.

The policy problem today is in part that the best economic policy practitioners in the Obama administration -- across the full spectrum and not just the faction represented here today -- are not pulling in the same direction.

Bravo to Biden, Jared Bernstein, and the rest for an interesting program -- but other powerful branches of the White House really should be here taking notes and participating in a constructive way in this discussion.

-- Steve Clemons

Tonight there is a classical music evening at the White House with Alisa Weilerstein (picture to left) and others -- and some of my close friends are there. I'm just wondering why I haven't yet made the cut for either the gay community events or culture nights like tonight! (One of these days I'll wiggle in.)

For those interested, the White House has a Facebook discussion set up for folks to chat about the performance which many watched live online. (sorry for late alert)

My buddy who runs special events at the Center for American Progress, Marlene Cooper Vasilic, is there. You may remember my featuring her on The Washington Note last year for winning the regional carp fishing contest. Seriously, she did.

And presidential tracker and Washington Times "Potus Notes" blogger Jon Ward just sent a note that David Axelrod is sitting in the front row, a few seats down from the first family, and he's awake.

Jon Ward is doing the pool report tonight -- and it's somewhat different than most reports sent our way. . .so for the record books:

I have a spelling for the 8-year old cellist who joined Alisa Weilerstein onstage to perform with her. It is Sujari Britt. The boy who played after that with Weilerstein was Jason Yoder, 16, on xylophone. Jason is from Pittsburgh Capa school and has performed for the White House before, joining Yo Yo Ma at Flotus' G20 spousal event last month.

By the way, we have a travel photo lid but not a paper lid yet.

One other note. I thought the program said Weilerstein was playing only one song, but she played what I thought was three. So I'm going to include here the entire list from the program. I had omitted some of this stuff before because, being the classical music expert that I am, I wasn't sure if it denoted a song or not. From the top.

Sharon Isbin - "Asturias" by Isaac Albeniz, and "Waltz Op. 8, No. 4" by Agustin Barrios Mangore.

Awadagin Pratt - "Passacaglia and Fugue in C Minor," and "BWV 582" by Bach.

Alisa Weilerstein - "Sonata for Solo Cello, Op. 8," and "III. Alegro molto vivace," by Zoltan Kodaly.

Joshua Bell & Pratt - "Tzigane" by Maurice Ravel.

Bell & Isbin - "Cantabile" by Niccolo Paganini.

Bell, Pratt & Weilerstein - "Piano Trio No. 1 in D minor, Op. 49," and "Finale: Allegro assai appassionato," by Felix Mendelssohn.

Jon Ward, Washington Times

More later.

I'll get to one of these things one of these days. I think it will take them deciding whether they want me as a political blogger or a more circumspect think tank policy guy -- or better yet, perhaps just a friend of insiders.

Tomorrow I will be hanging out with media traveling from Europe with German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle in the morning and then listening in on meeting with Vice President Joe Biden on what to do to bolster the American middle class co-hosted by the Center for American Progress and Economic Policy Institute.

-- Steve Clemons

(photo credit: Spencer Ackerman)

US military crusade chronicler Spencer Ackerman has written a long, thoughtful treatment of the issues and players wrestling over the tough calls President Obama must soon make on America's course in Afghanistan. It's titled "The Decision" and appears in The National.

I strongly recommend reading the entire piece, but here is a chunk I wanted to share:

The Bush administration viewed Afghanistan as a nation-building sinkhole that distracted from the war it wanted to fight. Accordingly, the military prioritised Iraq, and so no talented officer had any incentive to innovate in Afghanistan. The Democratic Party, all the way up to Barack Obama, insisted that Afghanistan was the truly necessary war, and turned it into a cudgel to be used against the Iraq war. American Journalists made careers in Iraq and barely asked for embeds in Afghanistan; their editors ticked the box by running an annual short feature, usually about how Afghanistan was the "forgotten war". There was no critical thought from anyone about arresting Afghanistan's deterioration, and half-true clichés about a "Graveyard of Empires" accumulated. That was the brittle architecture underlying the national consensus about Afghanistan. Without the supporting wall of Iraq, it has now collapsed.

Out of its wreckage, Obama will make two critical decisions in the coming weeks: whether a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is suitable for the country's woes; and whether a second troop increase in the span of a year is required to wage it. Obama's advisers, military and civilian, are locked in a debate over how to provide an alternative to Holbrooke's admission. Some, like Vice President Joseph Biden, contend that the complexities of counterinsurgency are both insurmountable and unmoored from the stated goal of removing al Qa'eda as a security threat. Others, like Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, contend that the United States has already spent eight years attacking al Qa'eda and senior Taliban leaders without regard for the conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the militants exploit to retain support.

But there is another debate layered on top of that one, both inside the administration and across the Washington foreign-policy community in general. That debate is about the meaning of the Afghanistan war and the scope of American commitment to it. But it is also about what lessons to draw from the Iraq war, and whether they can be exported to Afghanistan.

All of the ideological attention in Washington previously committed to Iraq is now flooding into Afghanistan - or at least to the simulacrum of Afghanistan that exists in Washington. That still-congealing ideology forms the prism through which Obama's ultimate decisions will be viewed. What was once a relatively simple (though operationally complex) mission to avenge the September 11 attacks has since been overtaken by theories about how to establish lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If those theories are correct, the United States may endure a period of bloody hardship but reap the benefits of radically diminishing the threat of al Qa'eda. If not, it will court disaster.

I spoke today to one of the nation's very top analysts of affairs in Afghanistan and Pakistan and this person made the point that whereas the military establishment fired a general in the course of the war and has tried to push reset to deal with realities on the ground as they have found them -- whether one believes in the course the Pentagon is taking or not -- the political strategy is simply missing, ad hoc, seemingly without strategic depth. This person asked how the administration could not have planned for the election scenarios, fraud, and general mismanagement of the civil society scene during these last few months.

And this person has generally been strongly supportive of both US military and non-military engagement in Pakistan and Afghanistan -- but this person echoes my own sentiments that the administration is confused, disoriented, and multi-headed about what to do in Afghanistan.

After eight years of inertia-driven engagement, it's time to work out a new strategy and endgame.

-- Steve Clemons

This is a guest note by BRIAN KATULIS, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. This article first appeared at the Center for American progress website on 2 November 2009, titled "Using U.S. Leverage to Strengthen Afghan Governance: Analysis of Karzai's Reelection"

Waiting for Obama's Post-Election Afghanistan Action Plan

Afghanistan's Independent Electoral Commission made it official today--it cancelled the second round of the presidential elections after Abdullah Abdullah pulled out of the race yesterday, and declared incumbent President Hamid Karzai the winner. As many senior Obama administration officials have noted, this outcome was not a big surprise--Karzai had a wide lead in the first round of voting and it would have been difficult, but not impossible, for Abdullah Abdullah to close the gap.

What the Obama administration isn't talking as much about is how it plans to structure the relationship with the new Karzai government moving forward. The Obama administration has rightly been in a holding pattern, waiting to see the results of what has been a messy and mismanaged electoral process. Now the pressure will understandably increase on the Obama administration to outline its revised strategy for the country.

If there's a silver lining to the messy electoral process, it is that the elections in Afghanistan brought to the forefront the significant challenges of corruption, poor governance, and leadership deficits that exist in Afghanistan.

Now that the election results are official, the Obama administration needs to work with its close NATO allies to set a clear plan aimed at outlining expectations for the Karzai government on fighting corruption, dealing with the drug trafficking, and advancing good governance. Some discussion of this emerged earlier this fall in a mini-policy debate over the draft metrics to measure progress, but that debate has unfortunately faded. Those draft metrics, quite frankly, were underwhelming on many accounts, reading like a vague wish list of things the United States would like to get done.

Vague wish lists won't cut it, particularly if President Obama is contemplating sending more troops into harm's way.

The policy and political debate in the United States has narrowly and simplistically focused on troop numbers--an important part of the equation, but not the only one. And conservatives have tried to reduce Afghanistan to a question of President Obama's determination and will, like in David Brooks' latest article in the New York Times, which takes us back to a time in 2002 to 2005 when conservatives treated national security like a football pep rally.

The missing ingredient from the Afghanistan policy debate has been a clear implementation plan for shaping the Afghan leadership's strategic calculations and actions. There are numerous documents and plans on paper--such as the 2006 Afghanistan Compact (pdf) and the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy. What's been sorely lacking is an actual policy and plan to achieve the goals and implement the ideas laid out in these strategies.

The Obama administration didn't have a clear implementation plan to accompany the strategy it released last March (pdf), and the policy was still very much a work in progress as demonstrated at an event we hosted at the Center for American Progress with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and his interagency team. Saying that "we'll know it when we see it" when it comes to achieving progress in Afghanistan is not enough--it's not enough to convince the American people that more troops and money are worth it, and equally important, it's not enough to shape Afghan leaders' calculations and actions, including the reelected Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

As my colleague Caroline Wadhams argued earlier this fall, the question of what to do about Afghanistan is not simply a question of troop levels. And it's not enough to talk in lofty terms about "smart power," as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates do.

The real test case of what is becoming the emerging Obama doctrine on U.S. national security is found in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and thus far the team has quite frankly not delivered the goods on the significant promise of "smart power." Doing so would mean having a clear policy implementation plan to shape the calculations and actions of Afghanistan's leaders.

So when President Obama announces his decision on Afghanistan--quite possibly later this month--he cannot simply talk about the troop levels, as important as that decision is. The Obama administration needs to outline how all of our resources--including our most precious national security asset, our men and women in uniform--will be used effectively to shape the actions of Afghan partners.

We had a rudderless policy for eight long years that did not effectively address this question of leverage in Afghanistan. The time has come for President Obama to bring real change to the policy debate on Afghanistan.

-- Brian Katulis

How can Washington avoid merely moving from one crisis to the next and instead engage in forward looking, strategic policy-making?

To address this question, the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program is hosting an event TODAY from 12:15pm - 1:45pm with James Locher, President & CEO of the Project on National Security Reform.

Locher will discuss the importance of reforming the national security bureaucracy and the recommendations of a new report, Turning Ideas Into Action.

Steve Clemons will moderate the event, which will STREAM LIVE here at The Washington Note.

-- Ben Katcher

Steve Clemons has discussed on this blog the importance of perceptions of power in international relations - and the immense harm that the Bush administration inflicted upon American interests by exposing America's military, economic, and moral limits.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration's aborted attempt to persuade the Israelis to enact a "settlement freeze" as a precursor to final status negotiations is further exposing the limits of American power, particularly in the Middle East.

New America Foundation/Middle East Task Force Director Daniel Levy has an excellent piece over at Foreign Policy in which he untangles the settlement issue and its likely consequences.

Here is Levy's bottom line:

After all of my questions, it is worth recognizing the question that is actually being asked of America from the citizens of the Middle East themselves: When will there be a serious American implementation plan for a two-state solution that recognizes the asymmetries of power and vital needs of each party and that is determinedly pursued by an administration which has, from day one, made Israeli-Palestinian peace a strategic American priority? On this question, we are all still waiting for an answer.

(Photo Credit: U.S. State Department Photostream)

-- Ben Katcher

Matthew Hoh, the first US government official to formally resign his post because of objections to America's course in Afghanistan, makes a compelling case that America has lost its strategic sensibilities in this war which President Obama has adopted as "the good war".

In this Al Jazeera/Riz Kahn Show interview above, the former military and foreign service officer articulates what some of us on the outside have been saying about America's engagement in Afghanistan -- there is confusion about mission, a lack of focus on al Qaeda, a muddled picture of the contours and motivations of the Taliban, and embrace of a government that is not liked in many parts of the country. Hoh argues, along similar but more informed lines that I have, that we are embedded in the middle of a civil war.

Read more about Matthew Hoh in this fascinating piece by the Washington Post's Karen DeYoung.

-- Steve Clemons

The Economist is the latest to weigh in on Turkey's growing diplomatic role in the Middle East and to question whether Turkey is moving away from the West and toward what has been called a "neo-Ottoman" foreign policy that increasingly emphasizes strengthening ties with Turkey's southern and eastern neighbors.

The article provides a thorough and mostly helpful account of Turkey's recent foreign policy, but I think it shares one key misconception with much of the recent Western commentary on this subject.

Here is what The Economist describes as the roots of Turkey's new, eastward-looking foreign policy:

The Turks are now back in the Middle East, in the benign guise of traders and diplomats. The move is natural, considering proximity, the strength of the Turkish economy, the revival of Islamic feeling in Turkey after decades of enforced secularism, and frustration with the sluggishness of talks to join the European Union. Indeed, Turkey's Middle East offensive has taken on something of the scale and momentum of an invasion, albeit a peaceful one.

This explanation, while partially accurate, is incomplete. Turkey's foreign policy posture must be understood in context.

A significant reason for Turkey's increasingly independent, "zero problems with neighbors" policy in its neighborhood is the fact that the United States' recent policy in the Middle East has been an unmitigated disaster - particularly since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 over Turkish objections.

Ian Lesser hit the nail on the head when he said back in 2006 that

For decades the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship was based largely on the defense of the regional status quo, territorial and political - an approach well suited to Turkey's essentially conservative foreign-policy outlook. Today, Turkey faces an American partner with more dynamic, even revolutionary objectives in areas of shared interest

Siding with the United States against the status quo in the Middle East is simply too risky of a strategy for Turkey, which does not enjoy the option of withdrawing to the safety of North America.

Remarking on the divergence of American and European foreign policies after September 11, Tony Judt said that "America's strategy of global confrontation with Islam is not an option for Europe. It is a catastrophe."

The same could be said for Turkey.

-- Ben Katcher

Daniel Yergin has issued an updated version of his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power.

When I asked why he chose to release an update of his earlier work, Yergin identified four key factors that have to be added to the energy policy picture. First, oil has become a financial instrument in and of itself; two, globalization has broadened demand significantly with the entry of India and China into the global economic network; third, the climate change agenda; and fourth, the explosion of technological innovation in the energy sector.

This book is a must read for those who want to delve into the oil and energy drivers of US foreign policy, and I really enjoyed this discussion with Yergin. I hope others find this seven minute exchange useful.

-- Steve Clemons